Why do anything? Answers to this question come in a range of qualifications that some may categorise similar to how ‘basic human needs’ have been categorised. Perhaps one does something to get sustenance, or to connect socially, to feel safe, to feel fulfilled, etc. Yet some circumstances may elicit a null answer: I do not know why I do this thing (or why I want to do this thing), I just want to/have to/do. Sometimes that kind of answer is closer to a “why not?” If it is some harmless endeavour, surely, yet even so, that kind of answer is subject to limitations, particularly that of ignorance: maybe it may seem as though it is harmless now while the whole extent of its influence is unbeknownst to the one who insists on “why not?”
I do not think, however, that such limitations have a panacea. One may argue that the beauty of existence is in the uncertainties. And that is the precise point from which I would bring up that perhaps it is some negative perception of those limitations, uncertainties, and consequences that make it seem necessary to ground life on reason/rationality, instead of allowing life to simply be.
A lot of the ways I make sense of my work in philosophy is based on how I make art. The latter has come to a particular point in which I have been more or less in the belief of the essence of ‘art for art’s sake’–not that art cannot be for anything else, but at the end of the day, art exists wholly because of itself, a truly and purely human endeavour. To make art is the same as to be human. From this, the idea of a professional artist and a hobbyist becomes more of an open concept than a strict qualification.
In my reflection on how a similar framework can apply to philosophy, I remember an article I had encountered in my undergraduate studies but had since been brought up so many times for so many reasons in various circumstances within and outside the university: Kristie Dotson’s “How is this paper philosophy?” (2012). Before going back to the paper, I had some semblance of memory of what it is about, yet that memory was more of a feeling of empowerment to persist in philosophy and a sense of liberation within the field. I looked back at it to see if there would be some guidance that it can offer in the quest to better understand why and how one ought to do philosophy.
Before I proceed with some ideas from the article, I lay out presumptions I actively hold regarding the matter:
- Philosophy is, like art, a wholly human endeavour. Similar to how there are professional artists and people who make art as a non-professional endeavours, there are also philosophers and people who do/study philosophy, as well as many other different forms of categorisation within and outside of these polarities.
- The question of “why” in philosophy is as important as it is in art, which is to say that it is not necessary for it to exist/persist. Philosophy may also be done for philosophy’s sake (and related to the previous reflection’s idea on liberation, may be the way to do it ‘freely’). This also means that it is possible and even so beneficial to consequently have many answers as to why one does it (philosophy/art/anything for that matter).
In that regard, I read the paper like an artist who has forgotten what art is/looks like but the art would be philosophy.
I think I have been able to get an answer, which is not an answer in a ‘normative’ sense of the word. How does an artist know what art is except by seeing/perceiving/being exposed to art in one way or another. And I hope in that regard that somehow this essay is a kind of philosophy or philosophising.
In the article, Dotson proposes an alternative to the ‘culture of justification’ that pervades the field of professional philosophy. The article was written in 2012, and in my own exposure to the field from the other side of the world, the pervasiveness of that culture looks different to me. I would dare say that it is much better here/now and perhaps the article and similar thoughts have been instrumental to this possibility. Despite that, I think her article illuminates something that is simply distinctly human/societal, in that I think this ‘culture of justification’ maintains its perversions outside of philosophy and over human society/existence in general.
We can look at things step by step to see how at every level of the human existence, there is a seeming insistence of justifying the human person, whether by that person’s actions or identity. A child should grow up into a good adult which means a particular image of what good and adult and person means. Every hour of an existence is accounted for, whether that means it is a ‘productive’ hour or a ‘necessary’ respite.
We may look at various individuals, institutions, and ideas to guide us in this process of legitimation, which is resonant to how Dotson would describe “most disciplinary practitioners” feeling “as if they are judge and jury over “appropriate” professional conduction and production”. This, we can translate, to how we hold particular agents as “judge and jury” over “appropriate” ways of living/existing/being. Dotson continues the point that these judges and juries “never” recognise “the demand to acknowledge the ways prevalent social and political structures of empowerment and disempowerment influence their judgement” (13). We can simply imagine the different ways that injustice and inhumanity persist all around the world. This is despite of the prevalence of knowledge and innovation at the present time. We may now be able to translate one language to another seemingly instantaneously, but the meaning of one human life and another remains lost to us.
Dotson offers a solution: a culture of praxis. It is an interesting take for the field of philosophy, yet for our current enquiry, I would like to close with a question: what kind of life would you live if you did not have to make sense/reason of it?
Some interesting lines from the article: Dotson, Kristie. 2012. “How is this paper philosophy?” Comparative Philosophy Volume 3, No.1: 03-29. ISSN 2151-6014.
“Rather, privileging legitimation narratives assures that most disciplinary practitioners feel as if they are judge and jury over “appropriate” professional conduct and production, while never recognizing the demand to acknowledge the ways prevalent social and political structures of empowerment and disempowerment influence their judgement.” (Dotson 2012, 13)
“A culture of justification, then, on my account, takes legitimation to be the penultimate vetting process, where legitimation is but one kind of vetting process among many.” (Dotson 2012, 5)
“Specifically, I take the question of how this or that paper is philosophy to betray at least one circumstance that pervades professional philosophy. It points to the prevalence of a culture of justification.” (Dotson 2012, 5)
“By relying upon, a presumably, commonly held set of normative, historical precedents, the question of how a given paper is philosophy betrays a value placed on performances and/or narratives of legitimation.” (Dotson 2012, 5)
“As a means of addressing the downsides of the current culture of justification within professional philosophy, I advocate for a shift in disciplinary culture from a culture of justification to a culture of praxis.” (Dotson 2012, 6)
“To say that philosophy has a culture of justification, then, is to say that the profession of philosophy requires the practice of making congruent one’s own ideas, projects, and, in her case, pedagogical choices with some “traditional” conception of philosophical engagement.” (Dotson 2012, 6)
“A privileging of “justification as a method” refers to a heightened value placed upon processes of legitimation, or identifying congruence between accepted patterns and standards with one’s own belief, project, and/or processes, for the sake of positive status.” (Dotson 2012, 7)
“In such theories of justification, there is an element of demonstrating the congruence between one’s belief and acceptable patterns and standards, or justifying norms, for the sake of positive, epistemic status.” (Dotson 2012, 7)
“Broadly privileging legitimation as an assessment tool for appropriate disciplinary conduct creates a culture of justification within a given discipline. That is to say, within a culture of justification a high value is placed on whether a given paper, for example, includes prima facie congruence with norms of disciplinary engagement, or justifying norms, and/or can inspire a narrative that indicates its congruence with those norms for the sake of positive status.” (Dotson 2012, 7)
“In a culture of justification, historical, unwarranted exclusions come to inform the very justifying norms relied upon for legitimation.” (Dotson 2012, 11)
“If positive, professional philosophical status rests on the fair application of justifying norms and the uniform acceptance of those norms, then many diverse practitioners can expect to fail adequacy tests by rote.” (Dotson 2012, 15)
“The burden of shifting justifying norms within a professional environment that manifests symptoms of a culture of justification involves sacrificing one’s labor and energies towards providing a catalyst for change via numerous legitimating narratives aimed at gaining positive status for oneself as a philosopher and one’s projects as philosophical.” (Dotson 2012, 15)
“Hence, we need to work towards a disciplinary culture that not only lessens the effect of exceptionalism, but can also create an environment where incongruence becomes a site of creativity for ever-expanding ways of doing professional philosophy.” (Dotson 2012, 16)
“One will no longer be asked to justify one’s projects according to some set of justifying norms, but rather one does need to identify a point of contribution within contemporary philosophy, outside of contemporary philosopher, and/or in surrounding worlds.” (Dotson 2012, 17)
“Everyone’s projects must contribute. And all projects will be seen as situated in historical questions, contemporary needs, and/or new or emerging investigations.” (Dotson 2012, 18)
“One does not call a bad short story a collection of words, except in a tongue and check fashion, because it is a bad short story. Accordingly, philosophy can be deemed poor philosophy without it ceasing to be philosophy.” (Dotson 2012, 18)
“Justification according to a supposedly monolithic set of justifying norms would no longer be relevant. Rather, smaller, reflexive validation mechanisms can emerge in accordance with the inquiries and questions under investigation. An appreciation of the smaller canons that emerge lessens the need to lay claim to some overarching set of canonical texts and/or questions in order to claim positive, professional philosophical status.” (Dotson 2012, 18)
“This is mainly due to the fact that, in a culture of praxis, what creates philosophical communities is a concern for contributions made according to one’s interests and community involvement, rather than a shared set of justifying norms.” (Dotson 2012, 19)
“This objection seems to follow from the idea that philosophy and philosophizing are not a widespread, human activity. It contains the assumption that there is something special about philosophizing that is in the purview of professional philosophy alone.” (Dotson 2012, 19)
“Let me offer an analogy to clarify this point. There are creative writers all over the world.” (Dotson, 19)
“For Lorde, this response is contingent on a certain approach to the world and living. It conceives of living as if it presented itself as a set of problems to be solved.” (Dotson 2012, 23)
“However, privileging philosophical theorizing without a medium that situates that theorizing so as to produce viable action is futile.” (Dotson 2012, 25)
“In this case, we can see how a culture of praxis can aid in proliferating the kinds of methodologies one relies upon and the texts included in one’s canon.” (Dotson 2012, 25)
“A culture of praxis, with its value on contribution, multiple canons, and multiple forms of disciplinary validation, would be flexible enough to identify philosophical engagement according to a range of factors.” (Dotson 2012, 26)